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US Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa

A Research Paper

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*Central Intelligence Agency
National Foreign Assessment Center*

November 1978

Summary

On a global basis, US economic interests in sub-Saharan Africa* are small. The region accounts for less than 7 percent of total US imports, less than 3 percent of US exports, and less than 3 percent of the stock of US foreign direct investment. Only 7 percent of total US net bilateral aid goes to the sub-Sahara. The United States does provide substantial aid through multilateral institutions, which in 1976 channeled almost one-third of their funds to sub-Saharan Africa.

Statistics for the continent as a whole obscure the importance of a handful of countries to US economic and strategic/political interests. Using four quantitative measures of economic interest and two, more subjective measures that consider strategic/political interests and the potential for economic growth, we have identified nine top-tier countries that qualify as "important" to the United States—South Africa, Nigeria, Zaire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Liberia, Sudan, and Zambia. A second tier of 15 countries—led by Angola, Kenya, Mauritania, Namibia, and Rhodesia—has been identified as moderately important to US interests. Sub-Saharan countries of marginal interest by our criteria number 24.

Three top-tier countries—Zaire, Ethiopia, and Zambia—and four second-tier countries—Tanzania, Kenya, Senegal, and Guinea—were among the 10 major sub-Saharan recipients of US bilateral economic aid in the mid-1970s. These countries accounted for close to 60 percent of US aid to sub-Saharan Africa.

* In this report the terms "sub-Saharan Africa" and "Africa" refer to all of continental Africa—except the northern tier of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Western Sahara—plus the islands of Cape Verde, Comoro, Madagascar, Mauritius, Reunion, Sao Tome and Principe, and Seychelles.

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
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US Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa

Introduction

This report examines US economic and strategic/political interests in sub-Saharan Africa on a country-by-country basis. In evaluating these interests, we have attempted to array the sub-Saharan countries by order of importance to the United States using the following criteria:

- *Supplies of strategic materials.* Countries of interest are defined as those providing 10 percent or more of a key mineral import to the United States and/or Japan and the major West European countries.
- *Total value of trade with the United States.* "Important" countries are identified as those with an annual trade value of \$100 million or more.
- *Trade balance with the United States.* "Important" countries have trade deficits of \$15 million or more annually.
- *Stock of US direct investment.* Countries of interest are those with a net book value of US investment of \$90 million or more.

In addition to these measurements, we have included two, more subjective criteria: the potential for economic growth, and the strategic/political importance to the United States. In judging the strategic/political importance of a country to the United States we have taken several factors into account, including size, location, and political influence. Appendixes A through E include country-by-country detail on each criteria employed in this report.

Using this framework, the sub-Saharan countries fall into three basic tiers in terms of their importance to the United States. The first group is relatively select, consisting of eight countries

that qualify as "important" under three or more of the criteria that we have established, plus Ethiopia, which is included because of the immense strategic importance of its geographic location. The second tier consists of 14 countries of moderate interest to the United States, qualifying under one or two categories of interest, and Djibouti. The third and largest tier includes countries that by our definitions are of marginal interest.

First-Tier Countries

South Africa is, to the United States, by far the most important country in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of trade, investment, strategic/political importance, and as a source of strategic minerals to the West.

South Africa is one of the leading world producers of 10 or so minerals and an important supplier of chrome, platinum, uranium, and other strategic materials to the United States and its allies. South Africa and Rhodesia account for some 90 percent of world chrome reserves. The only other appreciable producer of this mineral, and platinum as well, is the USSR. About one-half of US investment in sub-Saharan Africa is in South Africa, and US trade with that country is second only to that with Nigeria.

Almost 60 percent of Europe's oil supplies comes around the Cape of Good Hope. Moreover, South Africa's six ports are the most developed in southern Africa and handle traffic for several countries in the area.

South Africa plays a key role in the liberation struggles in Namibia and Rhodesia. Although the Pretoria government is currently stable, pressures for majority rule are potentially disruptive

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Figure 1

Sub-Saharan Africa: Indicators of Importance to the United States

	Supplier of key minerals to the United States and/or major allies	Large total trade value	Trade deficit with the United States	Large stock of US investments	Economic/ Profit potential	Strategic/Political
Angola						
Benin						
Botswana						
Burundi						
Cameroon						
Cape Verde						
CAE						
Chad						
Comoro Islands						
Congo						
Djibouti						
Eq. Guinea						
Ethiopia						
Gabon						
Gambia						
Ghana						
Guinea						
Guinea-Bissau						
Ivory Coast						
Kenya						
Lesotho						
Liberia						
Madagascar						
Malawi						
Mali						
Mauritania						
Mauritius						
Mozambique						
Namibia						
Niger						
Nigeria						
Reunion						
Rhodesia						
Rwanda						
Sao Tome						
Senegal						
Seychelles						
Sierre Leone						
Somalia						
South Africa						
Sudan						
Swaziland						
Tanzania						
Togo						
Uganda						
Upper Volta						
Zaire						
Zambia						

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to the South African economy and the economies of neighboring countries, which are closely linked to the South African market.

Nigeria, the second largest supplier of crude oil to the United States, is the major US trading partner in Africa. About 18 percent of the value of US crude imports originates in Nigeria, giving Lagos the lion's share of the US trade deficit with the sub-Saharan—76 percent or just over \$5 billion in 1977. Lagos also is an important oil supplier to Europe, particularly West Germany. Concentrated in the oil sector, the net book value of US investment in Nigeria, about \$340 million in 1976, is the third largest in Africa. Nigeria's size, resources, and nonalignment in East-West issues make it an important spokesman for Africa and the Third World. Lagos actively has sought to mediate between Angola and Zaire, Chad and Libya, and Ethiopia and Somalia; it is a strong supporter of the Frontline States, which are pressing the struggle against white domination in southern Africa.

Zaire, located in the heart of Africa, has had close ties with the United States since independence in 1960 and, among African nations, is noted for its pro-Western stance. Twice in the past 18 months, the US Government has helped Zairian President Mobutu meet threats to his rule and his economic lifeline in the copper region of Shaba; in return, Kinshasa provides a window on the Cuban and Soviet activities in Angola. Economically, Zaire is the largest non-Communist supplier of cobalt and the major source of industrial diamonds. In addition, Kinshasa supplies the United States' major European allies and Japan with copper and some agricultural products. Zaire is the sixth largest recipient of US investment in the sub-Sahara, with US firms involved in hydroelectric construction, tourist facilities, and manufacturing. This large African country accounts for 2.2 percent of total US trade with the sub-Sahara and had a trade surplus of almost \$60 million with the United States in 1977.

Ethiopia, by virtue of its location, the development of its large Army with Soviet and Cuban help, and its historically close ties with Washing-

ton is among the countries of greatest interest to the United States. In particular, its proximity to the Red Sea and hence to oil supply routes makes the policies of the Ethiopian Government of concern to the West. Although it accounted for only 1 percent of US-African trade in the mid-1970s, it was still one of the United States' major African trading partners before the Mengistu government took power in 1977.

Gabon, rich in natural resources, supplies appreciable quantities of petroleum, timber, manganese, and uranium to the West. Earnings from these raw materials give Gabon the highest per capita income in sub-Saharan Africa. While Gabon's trading partners have traditionally been in Western Europe—especially France—Libreville supplies 60 percent of US manganese imports. Gabon's stable and pragmatic government encourages foreign investment, and US investment—about \$90 million on a net basis—is second only to that of France. A member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, Gabon has not sought a leadership role in African or Third World affairs.

US investment in *Ghana's* aluminum refinery and other Ghanaian projects makes Accra one of the top nine recipients of direct US investment in Africa. Although US involvement is limited mainly to the aluminum refinery and to purchases of cocoa, Ghana is an important source of bauxite, manganese, gem and industrial diamonds, cocoa, and timber for the Europeans and Japanese. Even so, Ghana's economy is in bad shape, and its ineffectual agricultural policy and soaring inflation rate (more than 80 percent annually) may affect future production. Although Accra still commands some attention as a leader in Africa, this is largely a carryover from the days of Nkrumah and is on the decline.

Liberia's long and close historical ties with the United States have encouraged trade and investment there. In 1976, US net direct investment in Liberia was the second highest in sub-Saharan Africa, largely reflecting the country's political stability and the limited number of restrictions on investment. Monrovia also places ninth

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among US trading partners in Africa and provides iron ore, rubber, and timber to US allies as well as to the United States. Monrovia's moderate civilian regime identifies closely with the United States and is one of its primary supporters in African forums.

Sudan, located along the important Red Sea shipping lanes, has become more important strategically as Soviet and Cuban involvement in Ethiopia has grown. It is the United States' 14th largest trade partner in Africa, with a little less than 1 percent of total US sub-Saharan trade in 1977. With sales (mostly agricultural goods) of \$19 million and purchases (mostly machinery and other manufactures) of \$87 million last year, Sudan is one of the few sub-Saharan countries running a sizable trade deficit with the United States. Indeed, in the short run Khartoum's overall trade deficit will serve as a check on US sales since Sudan is experiencing a severe financial bind that limits its import ability. Over the longer run, the country has considerable potential for economic development and hence for foreign trade and investment opportunities. Sudan is one of the few African countries whose population is not faced with the problem of overworked land, and its agricultural potential is considerable—a fact that has not been overlooked by Arab investors in recent years. Sudan may also possess some mineral wealth; it already produces small amounts of gold and chromite and may have uranium and copper.

Zambia ranks 11th among US trading partners in Africa, and also accounts for almost \$200 million in US net direct investment. Zambia is a major source of minerals to several US allies, especially copper to Japan and the United Kingdom; it also produces some cobalt and soon may be extracting uranium and emeralds. Finally, Zambia is a moderate, nonaligned nation whose stability helps to calm an increasingly volatile environment. The primary political interest of the United States in Zambia stems from its position among the Frontline States involved in the Rhodesian liberation struggle. President Kaunda has been a voice of moderation among the Frontline leaders, advocating the Anglo-

American proposals on Rhodesia and supporting efforts for an all parties conference. These measures, coupled with Kaunda's support of Joshua Nkomo and his ZAPU guerrilla forces, have spotlighted Zambia.

Second-Tier Countries

Fifteen African countries are of some economic and strategic/political interest to the United States, according to our criteria. Kenya, for example, is eighth in terms of US net direct investment in Africa and is of some strategic importance—Mombasa is the only friendly port for the US Navy on the east coast of the continent. Madagascar concerns the United States because it supplies 20 percent of US graphite imports and some chromium to US allies. Guinea is an important source of bauxite for France and West Germany as well as for the United States; and Rhodesia has important chrome reserves. Although Djibouti is of little economic importance to the United States, its location on the Horn makes it of interest to the West.


Some of the countries that fell into the second tier of US interests in the mid-1970s may eventually become more important because of their mineral potential. Both Namibia and Botswana, for instance, already produce diamonds and copper; Namibia also is rapidly becoming a major uranium exporter. Other countries that qualified as second-tier members on the basis of 1976-77 data may already have dropped into the third tier of US interest. Most notably, with the recent US embargo on trade with Uganda, US trade value with Uganda will drop off sharply this year.

Third-Tier Countries

Twenty-four sub-Saharan countries are of little or no economic and strategic interest to the United States. Many, such as Benin, Mali, and Upper Volta, are small, with almost no resources. Others may increase in importance: Mozambique, for example, as it recovers from its post-independence slump. US attention to most of

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Figure 2


Sub-Saharan Africa: Major US Bilateral Economic Aid Disbursements, 1974-76¹¹ ODA and other official flows (net).

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Figure 3
Sub-Saharan Africa: Major Multilateral Economic Aid Disbursements, 1974-76¹



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these countries traditionally has been mainly for humanitarian reasons.

US Economic Aid Flows

In the mid-1970s, US net bilateral economic aid to sub-Saharan Africa averaged \$244 million annually, ranking the US second to France as a bilateral donor to the area. Taking about 7 percent of total US economic aid, the sub-Saharan countries did not absorb US funds commensurate with their share of LDC population. Out of the 48 countries of sub-Saharan Africa, five received more than one-half of the total bilateral aid disbursed and 10 accounted for about 70 percent of US outlays. With \$182 million in net US bilateral assistance in 1974-76, Zaire was by far the major African beneficiary of US largesse, its intake more than double that of the nearest contender—Ethiopia. Zaire's lead probably would be even stronger if 1977 data were considered since US flows to Ethiopia ebbed with the outbreak of hostilities in the area.

On a per capita basis, the top beneficiaries were somewhat different. Indeed, of the top 10

recipients counted by total value, only Mali, Niger, and Zaire were among the major per capita beneficiaries. Gabon and Botswana stand out on a per capita basis, their inhabitants gleaning \$22 each from the United States in 1974-76. Mauritania also ranks high while Cape Verde has obtained considerable help since its independence from Portugal in 1975.

The United States also is a major supplier of aid to the sub-Saharan area through its contributions to multilateral institutions, which in 1974-76 contributed \$1.1 billion annually to the region. On the basis of total value, the major multilateral aid recipients are similar to those receiving bilateral US assistance—seven out of the top 10 are the same, although rankings differ considerably with Kenya, Tanzania, and Sudan the top three multilateral beneficiaries. Multilateral aid also is more diffused than bilateral flows, with the top 10 African beneficiaries receiving only 53 percent of total assistance to the area. On a per capita basis, multilateral aid little resembles US bilateral outlays; only Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho appear in the top 10 of both lists.

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The author of this paper is [redacted]
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 [redacted]

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APPENDIX A

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: KEY MINERAL AND AGRICULTURAL SUPPLIERS

Thirteen countries of sub-Saharan Africa are appreciable sources of minerals for the West. Some countries account for a small share of US imports, but are significant suppliers to Western Europe or Japan. For example, Madagascar is an important source of chromium, and Mauritania a large supplier of iron ore for France, but these suppliers are not directly important to the United States.

South Africa

The industrialized West depends heavily on South Africa for four important metals—platinum group metals, chromium, manganese, and vanadium—and for others of lesser importance—antimony, gold, gem and industrial diamonds, nickel, and asbestos. South Africa accounts for about 87 percent of non-Communist

production of platinum group metals, 76 percent of gold, 57 percent of vanadium, 41 percent of chromium, 31 percent of manganese, 30 percent of antimony, 27 percent of gem diamonds, and 13 percent of industrial diamonds. It is also the world's third largest uranium producer and together with Namibia supplies an estimated 50 percent of the British and West German uranium requirements and about 10 percent of Japanese needs. South African nickel supplies are important to Japan and the Netherlands, while the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan are the principal importers of amosite asbestos, a heat insulating material produced only by South Africa, used in jet engines.

Zaire and Zambia

The bulk of Zaire's and Zambia's cobalt and copper supplies are exported to Western Europe, Japan, and the United States. Zaire, the largest non-Communist producer of cobalt, meets about one-half of US cobalt requirements. Zambia, a far smaller producer, exports most of its cobalt to the United Kingdom and Japan. Zairian copper is essential to Belgium's copper refining industry, while Zambian supplies make up a significant share of Japanese and British copper imports.

Gabon

Gabon supplies approximately 60 percent of US manganese imports and about the same share of US consumption requirements. France is highly dependent on Gabon for manganese—about 45 percent of imports—and uranium. Almost one-half of French uranium needs are supplied by Gabon and Niger. Gabon, the second smallest OPEC producer, sends about one-half of its oil exports to West European and US markets

Table A-1

Sub-Saharan Africa:
Principal Sources of Western Mineral Supplies

South Africa	Platinum group, gold, vanadium, chromium, manganese, antimony, nickel, asbestos, copper, tin, iron ore, diamonds, uranium
Zaire	Cobalt, copper, diamonds, tin, manganese, ¹ zinc ¹
Zambia	Cobalt, copper, zinc ¹
Gabon	Manganese, uranium, petroleum ¹
Ghana	Bauxite, manganese, gold, ¹ diamonds ¹
Guinea	Bauxite, diamonds ¹
Liberia	Iron ore, diamonds ¹
Namibia	Diamonds, uranium, tin
Angola	Iron ore, ² diamonds, ¹ petroleum ¹
Madagascar	Chromium, graphite
Mauritania	Iron ore
Rhodesia	Chrome, copper, ¹ gold, ¹ nickel ¹
Nigeria	Petroleum

¹ Accounts for less than 10 percent of US, European, or Japanese imports.

² Iron ore mines currently closed.

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where they account for insignificant shares of total Western oil requirements.

Guinea and Ghana

Bauxite from Guinea, the world's third largest producer is significant to France, West Ger-

many, and the United States. The United States relies on Guinea for close to 25 percent of its bauxite imports. When alumina is added to the import category as in table A-2, Guinea accounts for a smaller share of US imports because of its limited refining capability. Ghana, accounting

Table A-2

Major Developed Countries:
Imports of Selected Crude Materials From Sub-Saharan Africa, 1977¹

	Percent of Total Imports						
	Belgium ²	France	Japan	Netherlands	United Kingdom	United States	West Germany
Bauxite and alumina concentrates	0	73.6	Negl	0	62.0	12.1	45.8
Guinea		71.4			0.5	11.9	36.3
Ghana		0			56.7	0	0.5
Sierre Leone		0			4.8	0.2	9.0
Chrome ore and concentrates	46.8	47.9	41.9	83.9	57.9	39.2	51.7
South Africa	38.8	23.4	28.7	83.9	53.4	39.2	45.4
Madagascar	0	24.1	8.2	0	0	0	2.8
Mozambique	8.0	0	5.0	0	4.5	0	2.3
Sudan	0	0.4	0	0	0	0	1.2
Iron ore and concentrates	15.0	32.8	6.8	15.4	16.8	3.7	26.2
South Africa	0.1	4.6	5.5	0	10.2	0.6	6.4
Liberia	9.2	10.5	0.3	15.4	1.3	3.1	17.2
Mauritania	5.7	17.7	0.8	0	5.3	0	2.4
Manganese ore and concentrates	73.8	67.3	47.5	0	80.4	66.1	46.7
South Africa	37.2	21.3	39.9		54.5	3.4	46.4
Gabon	8.5	44.7	4.2		8.3	60.0	0
Ghana	17.5	0.9	0.3		17.6	0	0.2
Zaire	4.6	0	0		0	2.6	0.1
Tin ore and concentrates	99.1	0	0	40.6	4.5	Negl	28.8
South Africa	0			40.1	4.2	Negl	25.3
Zaire	74.5			0.5	0	0	3.5
Rwanda	22.4			0	0	0	0
Crude Petroleum	6.0	9.0	0	16.7	2.1	19.0	10.3
Nigeria	5.5	7.5		16.6	2.0	17.7	9.8
Gabon	0	1.5		0	0	0.5	0.3
Angola	0.5	0		0.1	0.1	0.8	0.1
Industrial diamonds³	6.3	8.2	24.2	17.6	0	51.5	34.8
South Africa	0.8	8.1	18.4	1.9		41.2	33.8
Zaire	0.2	0.1	4.1	8.0		7.6	0.6
Congo	1.0	0	0.4	1.8		0.9	0
Ghana	2.3	0	1.1	3.8		0.2	0.2

¹ Direct imports on a value basis only; does not include reexports.

² 1976 data.

³ Direct trade data do not accurately reflect country dependence on African diamond supplies because of DeBeers Consolidated Mines' extensive control over diamond marketing worldwide. Sub-Saharan Africa produces 73 percent of the world's industrial diamonds and 80 percent of the world's gem diamonds. The USSR accounts for most remaining world output. The largest African industrial diamond producers are Zaire (40 percent of world output), South Africa (13 percent), Ghana and Botswana (7 percent each). Among African gem diamond producers, South Africa ranks first (27 percent of world output), followed by Namibia (12 percent), and Zaire (9 percent). The UK classifies all diamonds as gem diamonds.

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for less than 1 percent of total world output of bauxite, sends most of its supplies to the United Kingdom, where it accounts for more than one-half of British import requirements.

Namibia

Namibia's principal mineral exports to the West are uranium and gem diamonds. Presently the world's fourth largest uranium producer, Namibia could move into the number three position in the not too distant future given its sizable reserves. Namibia ranks as the world's third largest producer of gem diamonds after South Africa and the USSR.

Rhodesia

Once a major supplier of chromium to the United States, Rhodesia accounted for 7 percent

of chromium and 10 percent of ferrochrome imports in 1976. Last year's repeal of the Byrd Amendment outlawed US imports of Rhodesian chrome. Other Western countries do not report trade with Rhodesia because of its political sensitivity. An indeterminable portion of Rhodesia's chrome is almost certainly processed in South Africa and accordingly is exported as a South African product. Recent technological advances in stainless steel production have lessened the importance of Rhodesian high-grade chrome to the West, but at the same time, have increased the importance of South African lower grade supplies.

Major Agricultural Suppliers

With Indonesia the only other significant source of robusta coffee and accounting for only

Table A-3

Major Developed Countries:
Imports of Selected Intermediate Goods From Sub-Saharan Africa, 1977¹

	Percent of Total Imports						
	Belgium ²	France	Japan	Netherlands	United Kingdom	United States	West Germany
Gem diamonds³	6.9	1.7	5.7	3.8	29.0	26.0	1.5
South Africa	5.6	1.7	1.8	2.9	24.2	22.8	1.5
Zaire	0.1	0	0	Negl	2.5	Negl	0
Sierre Leone	0	0	0	0.5	1.6	2.8	0
Ghana	Negl	0	3.8	0	0.3	Negl	0
Copper	68.1	14.5	61.3	2.4	28.0	12.6	21.3
South Africa	7.7	0.8	7.8	0	6.2	1.3	10.1
Zaire	55.5	2.6	5.8	1.0	0.5	0	0.6
Zambia	3.2	10.8	47.7	1.3	20.8	11.3	10.4
Ferromanganese	1.2	5.3	0	7.0	36.0	28.2	0
South Africa	1.2	5.3		7.0	36.0	26.0	
Gabon	0	0		0	0	2.2	
Ferrochrome and alloys	12.9	5.1	35.0	25.7	9.3	26.7	19.7
South Africa	11.5	5.1	35.0	25.0	9.3	17.0	19.6
Rhodesia	0	0	0	0	0	9.7	0
Nickel	5.5	7.6	18.5	17.4	0.6	4.7	10.9
South Africa	5.5	7.6	18.5	17.4	0.6	1.5	10.9
Rhodesia	0	0	0	0	0	3.2	0
Platinum group	0	17.3	40.6	3.2	73.5	61.7	9.7
South Africa		17.3	40.6	3.2	73.5	61.7	9.7

¹ Direct imports on a value basis only, does not include reexports.

² 1976 data.

³ See footnote 3 on table A-2.

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Table A-4

Major Developed Countries:
Imports of Selected Agricultural Products From Sub-Saharan Africa, 1977¹

	Percent of Total Imports						
	Belgium ²	France	Japan	Netherlands	United Kingdom	United States	West Germany
Coffee	7.5	60.2	25.7	31.8	54.6	20.5	26.3
Uganda	0.1	3.1	4.8	0.2	9.0	5.8	0.7
Ivory Coast	1.0	28.6	10.2	13.2	13.8	4.4	2.9
Zaire	2.0	8.6	0.2	0.5	0	2.1	2.3
Ethiopia	0.1	1.0	3.0	0.1	0.2	2.0	0
Tanzania	0.4	0.3	1.6	0.1	1.2	1.4	4.0
Kenya	1.4	1.4	0.9	9.6	20.7	1.3	10.1
Cocoa	24.5	74.6	64.1	68.9	77.8	29.8	58.6
Ivory Coast	14.2	40.2	1.5	12.6	8.0	13.3	18.4
Ghana	2.5	5.6	57.8	16.1	39.2	9.2	12.1
Nigeria	3.1	13.7	4.4	12.6	30.2	6.5	13.3
Cameroon	2.1	11.1	0.4	20.3	0.3	0.6	7.2
Sugar	4.3	42.3	15.2	4.4	34.7	8.3	1.3
South Africa	1.0	0.6	15.2	0.8	1.4	4.9	0.5
Mauritius	0.3	0.5	0	0.8	22.8	1.0	0
Mozambique	0.4	0.6	0	2.0	5.1	1.7	0.5
Reunion	0	34.6	0	0.2	4.6	0	0.1
Tea	12.8	5.2	1.8	26.8	37.8	20.7	5.5
Kenya	1.6	3.3	1.5	15.0	20.4	12.9	2.7
Malawi	1.4	1.5	0	3.8	6.1	4.7	0.7
Mozambique	0.1	0	0	6.1	4.4	1.9	1.2
Tanzania	5.3	0.1	0.3	1.8	4.4	0.6	0.3
Cloves	73.2	91.7	81.3	87.2	76.2	81.3	93.0
Tanzania	5.3	39.1	30.4	51.1	64.2	55.7	45.1
Madagascar	43.9	36.1	50.9	34.4	11.5	23.7	43.9
Comoro Islands	22.8	16.5	0	1.7	0	0	4.0
Vanilla	5.9	97.2	69.0	NA	10.1	85.8	94.8
Madagascar	1.7	81.6	65.0		8.8	80.0	89.1
Reunion	0	2.9	0		1.3	5.8	0
Comoro Islands	4.2	12.7	4.0		0	0	5.7
Wood (in the rough)	27.2	66.7	0.3	40.1	56.8	1.8	45.6
Ghana	1.0	0.6	Negl	2.6	9.4	1.0	9.6
Ivory Coast	10.9	28.1	0	9.2	22.9	0.6	16.4
Cameroon	8.9	3.6	0.2	16.8	5.2	0.2	5.6
Gabon	1.0	26.7	Negl	6.3	2.1	0	3.5
Liberia	2.0	4.1	0	4.2	12.8	0	5.1

¹ Direct imports on a value basis only; does not include reexports.² 1976 data.

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8 percent of world production, the United States, Western Europe, and Japan are highly dependent on African robusta supplies, which are used to produce instant coffee and for inblending with better quality South American grades. There are 16 sub-Saharan robusta producers, of which the Ivory Coast, Uganda, and Zaire are the largest.

Africa's high-quality cocoa is important to West European chocolate manufacturers. The Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Nigeria are the largest suppliers. Kenya, the world's third largest tea

exporter, supplies 20 percent of tea imports for the United Kingdom, 15 percent for the Netherlands, and 13 percent for the United States. Mauritius is a significant source of sugar for the United Kingdom as is Reunion for France.

Although Indonesia is the world's largest clove producer, the West depends on supplies from Tanzania, Madagascar and the Comoro Islands because Indonesia consumes virtually all its output. Madagascar, the Comoro Islands, and Reunion dominate the vanilla market, accounting for about 90 percent of world exports.

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APPENDIX B

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: TRADE VALUES AND BALANCES
WITH THE UNITED STATES

On a global basis, sub-Saharan trade with the United States is small, accounting for less than 5 percent of the total value of US trade in 1977. Only 14 of the 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa have annual total trade values of more than \$100 million with the United States; these 14 account for 93 percent of US trade with Africa.

Nigeria is by far the United States' major African trading partner, accounting for 54 percent of total US-African trade at just over \$7 billion in 1977. Because of its oil sales, Nigeria's trade surplus with the United States amounts to more than \$5 billion. South Africa stands a distant second in US-African trade with more than \$2 billion in trade in 1977—18 percent of the total. Ivory Coast is third as a sub-Saharan trade partner of the United States, with \$400 million or 3 percent of the total in 1977; the majority of Ivorian exports to the United States are agricultural, including cocoa, coffee, and tropical hardwoods.

Of the 14 major sub-Saharan trade partners, only two—South Africa and Sudan—generally

had trade deficits (f.o.b.) with the United States in the mid-1970s. South Africa's major exports consist of minerals and metals, while its imports from the United States are higher valued finished goods. Similarly, the United States purchases little of the agricultural produce Sudan has to offer, but supplies much of the equipment and other manufactured goods Khartoum needs for its development drive. Besides South Africa and Sudan, only 14 African countries ran trade deficits with the United States in the mid-1970s. Of these, four along with South Africa and Sudan—Senegal, Togo, Mauritania, and Cameroon—had deficits of more than \$15 million in any year.

The sub-Saharan countries generally have recorded increasingly large trade surpluses with the United States since 1972, mainly because of rising oil, coffee, and cocoa prices. At \$6.8 billion in 1977, the sub-Saharan trade surplus (f.o.b.) represented one-fourth of the US trade deficit; Nigeria alone accounted for three-fourths of the African surplus with the United States.

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Table B-1

Sub-Saharan Africa: Trade With the United States ¹

	1976				1977			
	Million US \$			Percent Share of African Trade With the United States	Million US \$			Percent Share of African Trade With the United States
	African Exports	African Imports	Total Trade		African Exports	African Imports	Total Trade	
Total	8,014.1	3,183.3	11,197.4	100.0	9,911.5	3,151.4	13,062.9	100.0
Nigeria	4,937.6	769.9	5,707.5	50.98	6,096.2	958.3	7,054.5	54.00
South Africa	924.8	1,347.6	2,272.4	20.30	1,268.8	1,054.4	2,323.2	17.78
Ivory Coast	247.6	63.6	311.2	2.78	317.6	89.2	406.8	3.11
Ghana	155.0	133.1	288.1	2.57	214.1	145.5	359.6	2.75
Angola	264.0	34.9	298.9	2.67	309.7	38.4	348.1	2.66
Zaire	193.1	99.4	292.5	2.61	173.2	113.9	287.1	2.20
Uganda	106.7	6.3	113.0	1.01	247.8	14.2	262.0	2.01
Gabon	189.8	45.9	235.7	2.11	224.7	29.6	254.3	1.95
Liberia	98.7	84.6	183.3	1.64	107.3	90.9	198.2	1.52
Kenya	60.0	43.0	103.0	0.92	92.0	76.9	168.9	1.29
Zambia	161.0	48.4	209.4	1.87	104.5	48.6	153.1	1.17
Ethiopia	94.4	77.7	172.1	1.54	89.6	58.0	147.6	1.13
Tanzania	46.8	35.7	82.5	0.74	78.3	38.7	117.0	0.90
Sudan	24.2	105.7	129.9	1.16	19.0	87.1	106.1	0.81
Madagascar	59.5	5.8	65.3	0.58	78.8	7.3	86.1	0.66
Cameroon	23.9	40.2	64.1	0.57	32.4	53.6	86.0	0.66
Mozambique	40.5	13.4	53.9	0.48	66.3	12.9	79.2	0.61
Sierra Leone	50.1	11.5	61.6	0.55	63.2	13.9	77.1	0.59
Guinea	43.5	22.7	66.2	0.59	44.5	16.0	60.5	0.46
Botswana	53.7	3.3	57.0	0.51	49.9	2.1	52.0	0.40
Rhodesia	45.8	0.8	46.6	0.42	49.3	0.8	50.1	0.38
Congo	55.2	13.8	69.0	0.62	37.3	12.3	49.6	0.38
Senegal	3.8	41.3	45.1	0.40	1.9	36.3	38.2	0.29
Rwanda	53.4	2.4	55.8	0.50	33.5	3.6	37.1	0.28
Mauritius	18.0	8.0	26.0	0.23	21.0	9.0	30.0	0.23
Burundi	21.7	2.5	24.2	0.22	25.6	3.4	29.0	0.22
Niger	Negl	7.8	7.8	0.07	15.1	8.4	23.5	0.18
Togo	0.7	19.5	20.2	0.18	0.3	23.1	23.4	0.18
Namibia	5.1	12.4	17.5	0.16	6.0	17.1	23.1	0.18
Malawi	10.6	4.6	15.2	0.14	17.8	2.7	20.5	0.16
Mauritania	0.1	18.8	18.9	0.17	0.2	17.9	18.1	0.14
Swaziland	8.9	1.0	9.9	0.09	13.3	1.6	14.9	0.11
Benin	1.1	13.8	14.9	0.13	Negl	13.7	13.7	0.10
Upper Volta	1.4	10.6	12.0	0.11	0.7	12.4	13.1	0.10
Chad	0.3	3.0	3.3	0.03	0.2	8.2	8.4	0.06
Mali	0.2	1.9	2.1	0.02	0.2	6.8	7.0	0.05
Guinea-Bissau	1.9	3.8	5.7	0.05	1.2	5.7	6.9	0.05
Somalia	0.5	9.6	10.1	0.09	1.8	4.8	6.6	0.05
Gambia	0.3	3.4	3.7	0.03	0.3	5.7	6.0	0.04
Central African Empire ..	2.3	0.5	2.8	0.02	3.6	0.8	4.4	0.03
Reunion	6.4	1.2	7.6	0.07	3.5	0.8	4.3	0.03
Lesotho	0.1	4.6	4.7	0.04	0.2	3.7	3.9	0.03
Djibouti	0.9	4.7	5.6	0.05	0.4	2.6	3.0	0.02
Seychelles	0.5	0.6	1.1	0.01	0.2	0.5	0.7	0.01
Cape Verde	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Comoro Islands	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Equatorial Guinea	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Sao Tome	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

¹ f.o.b.

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Table B-2

Sub-Saharan Africa:
Trade Balances With the United States

	Million US \$	
	1976	1977
Nigeria	4,167.7	5,137.9
South Africa	- 422.8	214.4
Ivory Coast	184.0	228.4
Ghana	21.9	68.6
Angola	229.1	271.3
Zaire	93.7	59.3
Uganda	100.4	233.6
Gabon	143.9	195.1
Liberia	14.1	16.4
Kenya	17.0	15.1
Zambia	112.6	55.9
Ethiopia	16.7	31.6
Tanzania	11.1	39.6
Sudan	- 81.5	- 68.1
Cameroon	- 16.3	- 21.2
Madagascar	53.7	71.5
Mozambique	27.1	53.4
Sierra Leone	38.6	49.3
Guinea	20.8	28.5
Botswana	50.4	47.8
Rhodesia	45.0	48.5
Congo	41.4	25.0
Senegal	- 37.5	- 34.4
Rwanda	51.0	29.9
Mauritius	10.0	12.0
Burundi	19.2	22.2
Namibia	- 7.3	- 11.1
Niger	- 7.8	6.7
Togo	- 18.8	- 22.8
Malawi	6.0	15.1
Mauritania	- 18.7	- 17.7
Swaziland	7.9	11.7
Benin	- 12.7	- 13.7
Upper Volta	- 9.2	- 11.7
Chad	- 2.7	- 8.0
Mali	- 1.7	- 6.6
Guinea-Bissau	- 1.9	- 4.5
Somalia	- 9.1	- 3.0
Gambia	- 3.1	- 5.4
Central African Empire	1.8	2.8
Reunion	5.2	2.7
Lesotho	- 4.5	- 3.5
Djibouti	- 3.8	- 2.2
Seychelles	- 0.1	- 0.3
Cape Verde	NA	NA
Comoro Islands	NA	NA
Equatorial Guinea	NA	NA
Sao Tome	NA	NA
Total	4,830.8	6,760.1

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APPENDIX C

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: US DIRECT INVESTMENT

Sub-Saharan Africa traditionally has not attracted a great deal of US direct investment because most countries in the area suffer from skilled labor shortages, small domestic markets, and frequent political instability. More recently, Africanization policies by host governments have discouraged US businessmen. At yearend 1976, only 2.6 percent of the stock of US foreign direct investment was in the sub-Sahara—a share that has held relatively steady for several decades. The net book value * of these investments stood at just over \$3.5 billion, with more than one-half the total in the extractive industries.

South Africa consistently has been the focus of US business interests in the sub-Sahara and at yearend 1976 accounted for almost one-half the stock of US investment in Africa at \$1.7 billion. Only eight other sub-Saharan economies—Liberia, Nigeria, Zambia, Ghana, Zaire, Rhodesia, Kenya, and Gabon—have investments of more than \$90 million. The nine countries together

account for almost 90 percent of US investment in Africa.

South Africa has traditionally been of interest to foreign investors because of the country's mineral resources, relatively developed services sector, generally high rates of economic growth, and favorable government investment policies. Only in the past few years have racial outbreaks against Pretoria's apartheid system as well as prolonged economic recession dampened US business interest. In 1975-76, US investment in the country grew only 14 percent, and South Africa's share of US sub-Saharan investment fell 5 percentage points.

In marked contrast to US investment patterns elsewhere in Africa, investment in manufacturing represented 42 percent of the US stock at yearend 1976. These investments play a major role in the South African economy. US companies dominate South African markets for some high-technology items, such as computers and aircraft parts, and are major competitors with European companies in large segments of the consumer and capital goods markets, including automobiles, home appliances, petroleum products, farm and construction tractors, and the

* Net book values are the cumulative values of holdings on companies' accounts and generally reflect the cost (after depreciation) of investment and reinvestment of earnings less liabilities. While book values are subject to a large degree of error and are likely to understate current values of investment, they have been used in this report because they are more uniformly defined and collected than any alternative valuation.

Table C-1

Sub-Saharan Africa:
Net Book Value of US Direct Investment By Economic Sector, 1976

	Million US \$				
	Total	Mining and Smelting	Petroleum	Manufacturing	Other
Total	3,506	803	1,115	951	637
of which:					
South Africa	1,665	699		707	259
Liberia	348	NA	83	NA	195
Nigeria	341	NA	281	35	25

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Figure 4
Sub-Saharan Africa: Net Book Value of US Direct Investment by Country, 1976

South Africa		MILLION US \$	1,665
Liberia	348		
Nigeria	341		
Zambia	199		
Ghana	171		
Zaire	103		
Rhodesia	100		
Kenya	93		
Gabon	91		
Madagascar	27		
Senegal	24		
Ethiopia	22		
Sudan	22		
Ivory Coast	19		
Cameroon	16		
Mauritania	16		
Tanzania	15		
Somalia	14		
Namibia	14		
Togo	9		
Benin	5		
Sierra Leone	5		
Uganda	4		
Lesotho	3		
Malawi	3		
Swaziland	3		
Mozambique	2		
Upper Volta	2		
Gambia	1		
Burundi	-1		
Angola	75		
Other	245		

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like. Another 42 percent was distributed among the mining, smelting, and petroleum industries.

Liberia accounted for 10 percent of US direct investment in sub-Saharan Africa in 1976. Political stability, the limited number of restrictions on foreign investors, and historically close ties with the United States have been among Monrovia's major drawing cards. About one-fourth of US investment in the country is in the transportation and communications sectors, reflecting the interests of US mining and rubber companies in developing routes to serve their own facilities. Investment in petroleum refining accounts for another one-fourth, while the traditional sectors of rubber and iron ore explain most of the rest.

The bulk of US investment in *Nigeria* in recent years—80 to 90 percent—has been connected with the petroleum industry. However, exploration activities were curtailed sharply in 1976 in response to Lagos' aggressive oil pricing policies, which cut into company profits. More recently, a revenue pinch has prodded the government into more liberal oil pricing policies, but the shift has not been dramatic enough to induce US companies to increase sharply investment funds. Overall, the investment climate in Nigeria has been far from ideal since the current government came to power in 1975 and changed investment laws to require partial Nigerian Government ownership in foreign investments.

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APPENDIX D

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: COUNTRIES OF STRATEGIC/POLITICAL IMPORTANCE

Although a number of African countries are important to the United States for various political reasons, we believe that four countries stand out for their strategic/political significance to the West. These countries—Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Zaire—were selected on the basis of: (1) their size, (2) their geographic locations, and (3) the implications and/or influence of political developments within their borders for other African countries.

Ethiopia is strategically important because of its large size relative to most other countries of northeast Africa and its proximity to the oil shipping lanes of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Both clearly make Addis Ababa the dominant power in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, the infusion over the past 18 months or so of \$1.5-2 billion of Soviet military hardware has made the Ethiopian military second in strength and resources only to those of Egypt and South Africa on the continent as a whole.

Ethiopia's strategic importance has certainly not been lost on the Soviets. Indeed, Moscow was willing to jeopardize and ultimately sacrifice nearly a decade of strategic equities it had painstakingly built up in neighboring Somalia—including the Soviet missile-handling facility at Berbera—in order to ingratiate itself with the military regime in Addis Ababa.

While ideological and political considerations clearly played a key role in Moscow's decision last year to switch sides in the Horn, the Soviets were doubtless also motivated in large measure by the desire to use their position in Ethiopia as a strategic springboard for influencing events in East Africa, the Persian Gulf, and perhaps other areas of the Middle East as well.

US strategic/political interest in *Nigeria* rests on the fact that Lagos is emerging as a spokesman for Africa and supplies almost 20 percent of US oil imports. In particular, Nigeria is playing an increasingly influential and generally pragmatic role on the African and international scene. Lagos aspires to become the political leader of Africa and to be heard as its voice in Third World councils. Nigerian views on US motives and policies toward Africa and the Third World can be important to the success of these policies. Nigerian attitudes have a direct impact on southern Africa, OPEC, and North-South issues.

Theoretically, Nigeria could use its economic clout in dealing with the United States because of its position as the second largest supplier of crude oil and a sub-Saharan state with one of the largest stocks of direct US private investment. While few Nigerians think in terms of resorting to an oil boycott in support of their foreign policy, the government has stated its intention to boycott firms with investments in both Nigeria and South Africa. In view of Nigeria's currently favorable attitude toward US southern Africa policy and its own strong need for foreign exchange to support economic development, Nigeria would consider some version of an economic boycott and the oil weapon only if all efforts fail to achieve a negotiated settlement for peaceful transition to majority rule in southern Africa.

US-Nigerian relations have become markedly warmer in the past year and a half as political goals of the two countries have converged, especially with regard to the conflict in Rhodesia. The improved climate of US-Nigerian relations

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is heavily dependent upon a continued favorable Nigerian perception of US intentions and actions in southern Africa and could be seriously set back by negative developments in the region.

South Africa, the most industrialized country in Africa, is the focal point for economic development and regional stability in southern Africa. US interests in South Africa extend beyond the economic considerations of trade and investment to the political situation in southern Africa. Not only is the internal situation important, but the impact of these internal problems on South Africa's neighbors is of concern as well. The sea route around South Africa is of strategic importance to the United States and to a lesser degree to Western Europe.

If majority rule comes to South Africa in a long and bloody struggle or if it results in mass emigration of whites, other countries in southern Africa could suffer real economic hardships. The repatriated earnings of migrant laborers in South Africa provide some of Pretoria's neighbors—Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Mozambique, Malawi, and Rhodesia—with a significant portion of their foreign exchange. South Africa also provides these neighbors with a large market in which to sell their exports and offers them a wider range of goods to import than might otherwise be the case. For example, Botswana exports a substantial amount of its beef to South Africa.

The liberation of southern Africa from the dominance of the white minority is the long-term objective of externally based South African liberation organizations, backed by the OAU and supported by the USSR and to a lesser extent China. Their efforts must be viewed in tandem with the extensive rioting and internal disruption by urban black South Africans that has taken place over the past two years. Unless the South African Government begins to make political concessions to blacks that involve genuine power sharing—a prospect that appears highly unlikely in the near future—there will be continued agitation and strife in South Africa.

Almost 60 percent of West European oil imports and 33 percent of US oil imports are

carried around the Cape of Good Hope. South Africa's six ports are the most developed and sophisticated in the southern African transportation system, which includes rail and combination of water-rail routes running from Pointe Noire in the Congo on the west coast around the Cape to Mombasa in Kenya on the east coast. A large proportion of southern Africa's exports transit South African ports; without them, transportation systems in Botswana, Lesotho, and, under the current political situation, Rhodesia, would be hamstrung.

Zaire's vast size—roughly equal to the United States east of the Mississippi—and its location in the heart of Africa with borders on nine states give it an important role in Africa. In addition, Zaire's pro-Western stance and traditional close political and economic ties with the United States make Kinshasa of continuing interest to US policymakers. Kinshasa has also provided the West with a window on the Cuban and Soviet activities in Angola.

Since seizing power in 1965, President Mobutu has held Zaire together in spite of a variety of intractable problems that periodically lead to disorders and raise the specter of a return to the bloody postindependence chaos of the early 1960s. The problems include deep ethnic and regional cleavages (Zaire consists of more than 200 tribes speaking 700 languages and dialects), severe economic difficulties, and animosities with some neighboring countries, particularly leftist-ruled Angola. Twice in the past 18 months, the United States and its allies have helped President Mobutu meet threats to Zaire's economic lifeline in the copper region of Shaba.

In seeking Western support, Mobutu has been successful in portraying the challenges to his regime as Soviet or Cuban inspired. He also has successfully portrayed himself as a moderate elder statesman holding the line against Communist encroachment in Africa. Mobutu probably believes, as do many observers, that his death would plunge Zaire into internal disorder, which would have a destabilizing effect on the entire central African region and create a situation favorable to exploitation by the Communists.

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APPENDIX E

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: ECONOMIC AID FROM THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER DONORS

Net bilateral US economic assistance to sub-Saharan Africa, which totaled \$773 million in 1974-76, is small compared to aid provided by former European colonizers. France is by far the largest individual aid donor, while economic assistance from Arab OPEC states has been growing rapidly in recent years. In contrast, bilateral US aid to the region declined, in part

due to a growing preference in Washington for multilateral assistance. The size of the Communist economic aid contribution, about 70 percent of which is given by China, remains roughly comparable to that of the United States. (See page 7 and tables E-1 and E-2 for a discussion of multilateral aid and US bilateral aid recipients.)

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Table E-1

Sub-Saharan Africa: Net Bilateral Economic Aid From the United States¹

	1974		1975		1976		1974-76	
	Total (Million US \$)	Per Capita (US \$)	Total (Million US \$)	Per Capita (US \$)	Total (Million US \$)	Per Capita (US \$)	Total (Million US \$)	Per Capita (US \$)
Sub-Saharan Africa	234.0	0.8	261.0	0.8	238.0	0.7	733.0	0.8
Angola	-1.0	-0.2	0	0	-1.0	-0.2	-2.0	-0.4
Benin	3.0	1.0	2.0	0.6	6.0	1.9	11.0	3.5
Botswana	4.0	6.0	5.0	7.3	6.0	8.7	15.0	22.0
Burundi	Negl	Negl	1.0	0.3	1.0	0.3	2.0	0.6
Cameroon	1.0	0.2	5.0	0.8	4.0	0.6	10.0	1.6
Cape Verde	0	0	0	0	3.0	10.0	3.0	10.0
Central African Empire	Negl	Negl	1.0	0.6	Negl	Negl	1.0	0.6
Chad	6.0	1.5	4.0	1.0	5.0	1.2	15.0	3.7
Comoro Islands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Congo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Djibouti	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Equatorial Guinea	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ethiopia	26.0	1.0	24.0	0.9	29.0	1.0	79.0	2.9
Gabon	3.0	5.6	3.0	5.5	6.0	10.9	12.0	22.0
Gambia	1.0	2.0	Negl	Negl	1.0	1.9	2.0	3.9
Ghana	-1.0	-0.1	4.0	0.4	13.0	1.3	16.0	1.6
Guinea	5.0	1.2	8.0	1.8	8.0	1.8	21.0	4.8
Guinea-Bissau	0	0	0	0	1.0	2.0	1.0	2.0
Ivory Coast	3.0	0.6	0	0	1.0	0.1	4.0	0.7
Kenya	10.0	0.8	7.0	0.5	11.0	0.8	28.0	2.1
Lesotho	3.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	4.0	3.6	9.0	8.6
Liberia	-2.0	-1.2	-2.0	-1.1	13.0	8.7	9.0	6.4
Madagascar	Negl	Negl	2.0	0.3	1.0	0.1	3.0	0.4
Malawi	4.0	0.8	4.0	0.8	5.0	1.0	13.0	2.6
Mali	17.0	3.1	10.0	1.8	5.0	0.9	32.0	5.8
Mauritania	9.0	6.9	3.0	2.3	7.0	5.0	19.0	14.2
Mauritius	3.0	3.3	1.0	1.1	Negl	Negl	4.0	4.4
Mozambique	0	0	0	0	10.0	1.1	10.0	1.1
Namibia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Niger	21.0	4.8	9.0	2.0	9.0	1.9	39.0	8.7
Nigeria	8.0	0.1	6.0	0.1	3.0	0.1	17.0	0.3
Reunion	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rhodesia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rwanda	1.0	0.2	3.0	0.7	2.0	0.5	6.0	1.4
Sao Tome	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Senegal	6.0	1.4	8.0	1.9	7.0	1.6	21.0	4.9
Seychelles	Negl	Negl	Negl	Negl	Negl	Negl	Negl	Negl
Sierre Leone	3.0	1.1	4.0	1.5	3.0	1.1	10.0	3.7
Somalia	Negl	Negl	5.0	1.6	2.0	0.6	7.0	2.2
South Africa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sudan	7.0	0.4	4.0	0.2	-5.0	-0.3	6.0	0.3
Swaziland	1.0	2.1	1.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	6.1
Tanzania	10.0	0.7	33.0	2.2	33.0	2.1	76.0	5.0
Togo	3.0	1.4	2.0	0.9	2.0	0.9	7.0	3.2
Uganda	1.0	0.1	Negl	Negl	Negl	Negl	1.0	0.1
Upper Volta	7.0	1.2	5.0	0.8	8.0	1.3	20.0	3.3
Zaire	63.0	2.6	92.0	3.7	27.0	1.1	182.0	7.4
Zambia	9.0	1.9	5.0	1.0	7.0	1.4	21.0	4.3

¹ ODA and OOF.

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Table E-2

Sub-Saharan Africa: Economic Aid From Multilateral Institutions

	1974		1975		1976		1974-76	
	Total (Million US \$)	Per Capita (US \$)	Total (Million US \$)	Per Capita (US \$)	Total (Million US \$)	Per Capita (US \$)	Total (Million US \$)	Per Capita (US \$)
Sub-Saharan Africa	921.1	3.0	1,290.9	4.0	1,212.4	3.7	3,424.4	3.6
Angola	0.1	Negl	0.8	0.1	7.1	1.2	8.0	1.3
Benin	16.2	5.4	24.1	7.8	24.6	7.7	64.9	20.9
Botswana	15.1	21.6	15.4	22.0	9.1	13.0	39.6	56.6
Burundi	15.4	4.1	23.2	6.1	19.9	5.1	58.5	15.3
Cameroon	27.5	4.4	66.3	10.4	53.4	8.2	147.2	23.0
Cape Verde	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Central African Empire	18.3	10.8	23.7	13.2	12.6	7.0	54.6	31.0
Chad	31.6	8.1	33.2	8.3	17.7	4.3	82.5	20.7
Comoro Islands	0.2	0.7	4.1	13.7	13.6	45.3	17.9	59.7
Congo	17.6	17.6	18.7	14.4	25.6	18.3	61.9	50.3
Djibouti	0.7	7.0	0.3	3.0	0	0	1.0	10.0
Equatorial Guinea	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ethiopia	45.7	1.7	67.4	2.2	65.9	2.3	174.0	6.2
Gabon	0.3	0.6	5.9	11.8	4.3	7.2	10.5	19.6
Gambia	5.5	11.0	4.5	9.0	4.5	9.0	14.5	29.0
Ghana	13.8	1.4	20.0	2.0	30.0	2.9	63.8	6.3
Guinea	1.2	0.3	5.1	1.2	5.0	1.1	11.3	2.6
Guinea-Bissau	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ivory Coast	58.4	11.0	68.8	12.5	52.7	7.6	179.9	31.1
Kenya	54.7	4.2	97.0	7.3	107.4	7.7	259.1	19.2
Lesotho	9.7	9.7	14.0	14.0	12.0	10.9	35.7	34.6
Liberia	11.0	6.5	14.9	8.3	14.8	9.9	40.7	24.7
Madagascar	31.9	4.3	63.4	8.6	36.1	4.7	131.4	17.6
Malawi	11.5	2.3	17.1	3.4	20.0	3.8	48.6	9.5
Mali	47.7	8.7	63.2	11.3	32.6	5.7	143.5	25.7
Mauritania	17.0	13.0	3.1	2.4	24.0	17.1	44.1	32.5
Mauritius	11.5	12.8	17.3	19.2	9.9	11.0	38.7	43.0
Mozambique	0.1	Negl	8.0	0.9	35.7	3.9	43.8	4.8
Namibia	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Niger	56.5	12.8	46.7	10.2	45.2	9.6	148.4	32.6
Nigeria	49.8	0.8	43.2	0.7	46.2	0.7	139.2	2.2
Reunion	4.2	8.4	8.7	17.4	6.9	13.8	19.8	39.6
Rhodesia	-4.5	-0.7	-4.6	-0.7	-4.2	-0.6	-13.3	-2.0
Rwanda	15.1	3.7	29.1	6.9	22.2	5.2	66.4	15.8
Sao Tome	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Senegal	43.5	10.4	56.5	13.1	42.2	9.6	142.2	33.1
Seychelles	0.1	1.7	0.2	3.3	0.5	8.3	0.8	13.3
Sierra Leone	9.2	3.4	12.2	4.5	8.7	3.1	30.1	11.0
Somalia	33.5	10.8	51.5	16.1	51.6	16.1	136.6	43.0
South Africa	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Sudan	59.7	3.5	63.7	3.6	79.2	4.4	202.6	11.5
Swaziland	5.7	11.4	10.5	21.0	10.6	21.2	38.3	53.6
Tanzania	30.4	2.1	107.4	7.1	66.7	4.3	204.5	13.5
Togo	14.9	6.8	16.3	7.4	20.6	9.0	51.8	23.2
Uganda	10.3	0.9	15.1	1.3	13.2	1.1	38.6	3.3
Upper Volta	43.9	7.6	35.7	6.0	23.9	3.9	103.5	17.5
Zaire	30.3	1.3	60.0	2.4	63.8	2.5	154.1	6.2
Zambia	55.8	11.6	64.2	13.1	76.6	15.3	196.6	40.0

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Table E-3

Sub-Saharan Africa:
Net Disbursements of Official Funds

	Million US \$			
	1974	1975	1976	1974-76
Total	3,039	3,976	4,387	11,402
United States	234	261	238	733
France	648	806	821	2,275
Other industrial	861	1,234	1,350	3,445
of which:				
West Germany	181	163	305	649
Canada	137	222	175	534
Belgium	140	175	165	480
United Kingdom	121	131	152	404
Sweden	76	129	135	340
OPEC Arab	195	214	511	920
Communist	180	170	255	605
of which:				
China	130	109	184	423
Soviet Union	43	39	31	113
Eastern Europe	7	22	40	69
Multilateral	921	1,291	1,212	3,424

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